I thought I’d devote an entry to summarizing the threats identified in the Department of Homeland Security’s Small Vessel Security Strategy.

The document asserts that the “maritime domain” is extremely vulnerable.

The four scenarios of gravest concern in using small vessels in terrorist-related attacks have been identified as:
a. Domestic Use of Waterborne Improvised Explosive Devices (WBIEDs);
b. Conveyance for smuggling weapons (including WMDs) into the United States;
c. Conveyance for smuggling terrorists into the United States; and
d. Waterborne platform for conducting a stand-off attack (e.g. Man-Portable Air-Defense System (MANPADS) attacks).

The document explores each of these, with examples and a brief analysis of the potential impacts.

For example, the report lists five recent examples of WBIED attacks (you are memorizing all these fancy new acronyms, aren’t you?), including the October 2000 attack on the USS Cole. It follows these with this summary:

Significant naval assets [...] such as offshore oil platforms, merchant vessels (including oil and chemical tankers), and passenger vessels (such as ferries and cruise ships) operate in areas that are frequented by small vessels. Small vessels may easily blend or disappear into other vessel traffic in ports and the coastal maritime environment, and are usually subject to less scrutiny than larger vessels in these areas. They are often inconspicuous, fast, highly maneuverable, and able to quickly relocate via roads and surface transportation, making them particularly dangerous and lethal if used as WBIEDs.

It’s difficult to argue with this reasoning. Small boats possess tremendous potential for criminal misuse, as they always have.

But when the report starts discussing the WMD risk, things really start to get scary.

One of the gravest maritime risks facing the nation is the potential for a terrorist group to obtain a WMD and detonate it within the confines of a major U.S. port city, military installation, or industrial facility. Closely aligned with this is the potential for the maritime domain to be used as a transportation system for such a weapon, weapon materials, or its components, with an eventual target further inland.

The 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), “assesses that al-Qaeda will continue to try to acquire . . . radiological and nuclear material and would not hesitate to use them if it develops what it deems is sufficient capability.” While there is no evidence that they possess WMDs at this time or that they intend to use small vessels as a means of transport to the United States, the use of small vessels to smuggle drugs and other contraband into the United States is instructive as to our vulnerability to the exploitation of small vessel characteristics to smuggle WMDs into the United States.

[...]

Fissile material is the most difficult component of a nuclear weapon to obtain. Because the material is better secured in U.S. facilities, it more probably would be acquired by a terrorist organization overseas where some of the larger and less well secured potential sources for nuclear weapons and materials exist. These weapons or materials would be more likely to be transported via maritime modes. Small vessels provide a clear opportunity for terrorists to retain control of the WMD and activate it at the optimum times.

 

The consequences of a WMD attack anywhere in the United States could be catastrophic, and potentially include millions of people killed and injured, billions of dollars in direct and indirect economic losses, and adverse environmental effects including the contamination of the impact area with subsequent loss of its use for decades.

Well gosh, thanks guys…that should help me sleep better.

Honestly, a bit of gallows humor is the only halfway-rational response I can come up with to this!

In comparison to the WBIED and WMD risks, the next scenario isn’t really very frightening at all: Small vessels might be used as a conveyance for smuggling bad people or bad stuff into the United States.

Ya think? I mean, of course it’s bad and everything, but really, don’t we live with this all the time? It’s only scary when powerful weapons are involved, right?

Well, yes, but it’s included here for a reason. See, the WMD and WBIED risks have a fairly low likelihood of occurring, but could have a devastating impact if they were to occur. At the other end of the spectrum, the smuggling risk has…well…about a 100% chance of occurring, and USUALLY produces a small impact when it occurs. It’s important to cover risks at both ends of the spectrum, because, as we shall see later in the document, it helps justify the strategy’s recommendations.

The last risk scenario was the most mysterious for me, probably because I don’t really understand what they mean.

The use of a small vessel as a platform for conducting a stand-off attack is viable. [...] It is technically feasible to launch a ballistic missile from a ship as small as 200 tons against the United States. A substantial, cooperative effort between the ship’s crew and missile launch personnel would be required to achieve a successful launch.

So if I’m understanding this correctly, they’re talking about something like Scud missiles being launched just offshore, able to hit targets up to 150 miles or so inland? Yeah, OK, I’m against that.

The exploitation of a small vessel to provide a stand-off attack platform provides numerous benefits for terrorists. The use of a small vessel as a stand-off weapon platform provides greater operational security, improved access to targets (bypassing shore-side security measures), and a ready means of escape. It also increases difficulty for protecting assets due to the relative quickness and maneuverability of many small vessels in evasive situations.

I’m still a little unclear about this threat, though. This sounds more like a military operation, and one that would require genuine military assets and personnel to accomplish. I’m out of my depth here, so if somebody understands this part of the threat better, please chime in.

So there it is. The maritime domain is vulnerable, with security gaps you could drive…well…lots and lots of “small vessels” through.

And just what are we going to do about it? That, dear readers, is a topic for another day.